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Abstract
We discuss a continuous variables method of quantum key distribution employing strongly po-
larized coherent states of light. The key encoding is performed using the variables known as Stokes
parameters, rather than the field quadratures. Their quantum counterpart, the Stokes operators Sˆi
(i=1,2,3), constitute a set of non-commuting operators, being the precision of simultaneous mea-
surements of a pair of them limited by an uncertainty-like relation. Alice transmits a conveniently
modulated two-mode coherent state, and Bob randomly measures one of the Stokes parameters of the
incoming beam. After performing reconciliation and privacy amplification procedures, it is possible
to distill a secret common key. We also consider a non-ideal situation, in which coherent states with
thermal noise, instead of pure coherent states, are used for encoding.
1 Introduction
Since the introduction of quantum cryptography by Bennett and Brassard more than twenty years ago
[1], research in this field has undergone a significant growth. As recent developments related to applica-
tions we may cite the first bank transfer via a quantum protocol [2], and the demonstration of quantum
key distribution in telecom fibers over 122 km [3]. Despite of the fact that quantum cryptography rep-
resents one of the most advanced sub-fields of quantum information processing, there is a great deal of
research to be done. One of the main challenges in this respect is the integration of quantum cryptog-
raphy protocols with more conventional communication systems, which would require systems robust
enough to resist possible attacks as well as environmental influences. A considerable number of propos-
als, including the first one, the BB84 [1], rely upon the existence of (low speed) single photon sources
for the transmitter Alice and single photon detectors (with long recovery times) for the receiver Bob,
being one of the forms of the protocol based on the polarization properties of single photons. Because
the generation of single photons is not a simple task, most of the experiments use weak coherent pulses
(highly attenuated lasers) instead, as an approximation to single photons [4]. Some alternative proposals
using continuous variables sources, such as squeezed states have been already presented [5]. Although
squeezed states-based schemes are interesting because they employ pulses with many photons instead of
single photons3, they still require special sources of non-classical light. Nevertheless, it has been shown
that equivalent levels of security may be achieved using the “quasi-classical” coherent states [6, 7], with
full exploration of the continuous variable nature of coherent states (all continuous scheme). Coherent
states are easy to generate, are relatively robust against losses, and therefore they constitute a basic
resource for viable quantum key distribution schemes. Usually, the key encoding in continuous variable
schemes is implemented in the quadratures variables [6, 7], being its security based on the impossibility of
sharp simultaneous measurements of the quadratures themselves. However, a synchronized local oscillator
for homodyne detection, connecting Alice’s and Bob’s stations is required for quadrature measurements,
which represents a difficulty if one aims a stable system for performing quantum key distribution between
two points at larger distances. Here we discuss a different way of key encoding, yet using coherent states
but without a necessity of a separate local oscillator. Our proposal [8] makes use of the polarization
properties of coherent states. A polarized coherent state may be conveniently represented as a two-mode
coherent state, or two single-mode coherent states excited in orthogonal directions [9]. The variables
which completely determine the polarization properties of the classical electromagnetic field are known
as Stokes parameters [10, 11], and their quantum mechanical analogues, the (hermitian) Stokes operators
[12] are adequate tools for the quantum mechanical description of light polarization. Three of the four
Stokes operators do not commute, yielding the well known [9, 12] uncertainty-like relations among them.
As a matter of fact, any pair of non commuting quantum continuous variables (quadratures, polarization
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variables) would be suitable for a continuous variable quantum key distribution protocol. The expecta-
tion values as well as the variances of the Stokes operators may be readily measured using linear optical
devices and PIN photodiodes, without the need of a separate local oscillator and single photon detectors
[9, 13]. The quantum mechanical fluctuations of light polarization have been at the basis of proposals
for continuous variable quantum cryptography using polarization-entangled beams [9], for instance. A
different scheme using polarized laser beams and Stokes parameters measurements, without the need of
entangled or squeezed states, has been recently implemented [14]; it employs a predetermined set of four
coherent states with distinct polarizations, and a post-selection procedure should introduced in order to
reduce the information available to Eve. Another significant advance in continuous variable quantum
key distribution is the recently proposed method which does not require random switching between mea-
surement bases [15]. As a result a significantly larger secret key rate is achieved, in comparison to the
random switching case. Our paper is organized as follows; in section 2 we introduce the Stokes operators;
in section 3 we show the basic steps to be followed in order to implement the protocol; in section 4 we
discuss the security of the protocol against noise; in section 5 we summarize our conclusions.
2 Stokes operators
We consider two orthogonal modes of the electromagnetic field having polarizations oriented along the
cartesian axis x and y. In the case of the quantized field, the photon creation (annihilation) operators
associated to each mode may be written as aˆ†x (aˆx) and aˆ
†
y (aˆy). They satisfy the usual commutation
relations
[
aˆi, aˆ
†
j
]
= δij , i, j = x, y. (1)
The hermitian Stokes operators are defined as [12]
Sˆ0 = aˆ
†
xaˆx + aˆ
†
yaˆy = nˆx + nˆy (2)
Sˆ1 = aˆ
†
xaˆx − aˆ
†
yaˆy = nˆx − nˆy (3)
Sˆ2 = aˆ
†
xaˆy + aˆ
†
yaˆx (4)
Sˆ3 = i
(
aˆ†yaˆx − aˆ
†
xaˆy
)
. (5)
Consider the field prepared in the two-mode coherent state
|ψxy〉 = |αx〉x |αy〉y = Dˆx (αx) Dˆy (αy) |0〉x |0〉y , (6)
i.e., mode x prepared in a single-mode coherent state |αx〉 and mode y prepared in a single-mode coherent
state |αy〉, with aˆi |αi〉 = αi |αi〉. The expectation values of the Stokes operators of the field in state |ψxy〉
will read 〈
Sˆ0
〉
= |αx|
2 + |αy|
2
〈
Sˆ1
〉
= |αx|
2 − |αy|
2
〈
Sˆ2
〉
= α∗xαy + α
∗
yαx〈
Sˆ3
〉
= i
(
α∗yαx − α
∗
xαy
)
(7)
which are just the classical Stokes parameters describing the polarization of a light beam of intensity〈
Sˆ0
〉
and with an electric field with amplitude αx in the x direction and αy in the y direction. Therefore
the coherent states correspond to classical fully polarized fields. However, the Stokes operators exhibit
quantum mechanical fluctuations, e.g., their variances in the two-mode coherent state above are
Vi ≡
〈
(∆Sˆi)
2
〉
=
〈
Sˆ2i
〉
−
〈
Sˆi
〉2
=
〈
Sˆ0
〉
. i = 0, 1, 2, 3 (8)
The Stokes operators obey the following angular momentum-like commutation relations [9, 12]
[
Sˆj , Sˆk
]
= 2iǫjklSˆl, j, k, l = 1, 2, 3. (9)
This means that the precision of simultaneous measurements of a pair of Stokes parameters is limited by
an uncertainty-like relation. For instance,
(V2V3)
1/2
≥
∣∣∣〈Sˆ1
〉∣∣∣ . (10)
We remark that unlike the quadrature operators, the product of the variances of the Stokes operators is
not a constant. However, for Sˆ0, whose mean value is basically the field intensity,[
Sˆ0, Sˆi
]
= 0, i = 1, 2, 3. (11)
The quantum mechanical properties of the Stokes operators turn them potential candidates for quantum
key distribution purposes. A most remarkable property of the Stokes operators is that their measurement
may be accomplished with well established optical measurement methods, given the simple interpretation
of the expectation values in Eqs. (7) as differences of light intensity of components oriented along the
reference axes (xy),
〈
Sˆ1
〉
= Ix− Iy, along the axes rotated of π/4
〈
Sˆ2
〉
= I45◦ − I−45◦ , and the intensity
difference between right circularly and left circularly polarized light components
〈
Sˆ3
〉
= Iσ+ − Iσ− .
3 The protocol
We present now the principles of our protocol: Alice generates a coherent beam of intensity S0. A conve-
nient preparation for that beam is a highly polarized two-mode coherent state. Using the representation
of Eq. (6), if the beam is strongly polarized in the x direction, so that |αx|
2
≫ |αy|
2
, it follows from Eqs.
(7) that 〈
Sˆ1
〉
≈
〈
Sˆ0
〉
= |αx|
2
. (12)
We also have that
〈
Sˆ1
〉
≫
〈
Sˆ2
〉
,
〈
Sˆ3
〉
. Therefore the uncertainty-like relation in Eq. (10) may be
approximately written as
(V2V3)
1/2
≥ |αx|
2. (13)
This means that for a given field intensity |αx|
2, the product of the variances of Sˆ2 and Sˆ3 is basically a
constant. As a consequence, we may also write
[
Sˆ2, Sˆ3
]
= 2i|αx|
2. (14)
We recall that for the quadrature operators Xˆ = (aˆ† + aˆ) and Yˆ = (aˆ† − aˆ)i, we have that
[
Xˆ, Yˆ
]
= 2i.
It would be then convenient to normalize the Stokes operators as sˆi = Sˆi/|αx|, so that [sˆ2, sˆ3] = 2i. In
summary, we have a clear correspondence between the noise properties of the pair of non-commuting
quadrature operators (Xˆ, Yˆ ) and the pair of (normalized) Stokes operators (sˆ2, sˆ3). Under such circum-
stances it becomes possible to encode the key elements in the Stokes variables S2 and S3 similarly as it is
done in other continuous variables schemes based on the quadratures, for instance [6]. The beam gener-
ated by Alice crosses an electro-optical modulator and a magneto-optical modulator in sequence, in such
a way that small random and independent modulations of the Stokes variables S3 and S2 are performed,
i.e., two random numbers, S3 and S2, are drawn from a Gaussian distribution of mean value zero and
variance Vm [6, 7]. Alice then sends the modulated beam to Bob, who randomly chooses to measure either
S2 or S3. As it is usual in quantum cryptography protocols, Alice and Bob establish communication via
a public authenticated channel and Bob informs Alice which Stokes variable he has measured. After
repeating that process several times, Alice and Bob will share a set of Gaussian correlated variables, or
“key elements” [7]. Such raw data must be adequately processed in order to generate a common secret
binary key (a string of bits). Error correction should be performed, and the information available to a
potential eavesdropper (Eve) should be minimized via a “sliced reconciliation procedure” [16], necessary
to convert the continuous correlated variables in bit strings; after that the bit string should be made
secret (privacy amplification).
As we have already seen, the noise properties of the Stokes variables S2 and S3 of a strongly
linearly polarized coherent beam are similar to the ones of the quadrature variables. We therefore expect
that the procedures and analysis of the protocol security to be similar as well. A key point concerning
the security of our protocol is the random Gaussian modulation of the Stokes parameters. The Gaussian
noise superimposed to the quantum noise of the polarization variables makes virtually impossible the
retrieval of any information by Eve, while the reconciliation procedure allows to both Alice and Bob to
establish a common secret key. This means that the data processing necessary for the key establishment
is basically the same to the one implemented in the quadrature protocol [7].
4 Security and noisy states
The eavesdropper Eve is supposed to have perfect equipment and unlimited computational power at her
disposal. This means that she may perform different kinds of attacks while tapping the quantum channel
between Alice and Bob. Here we are going to analize a particular (but rather effective) attack known as
the individual cloning attack. We assume that Eve is able to intercept the signal producing two identical
copies of the quantum state sent by Alice. She keeps one copy and sends the other to Bob. However,
because of the no-cloning theorem [19, 20], i.e., the impossibility of making perfect copies from unknown
states, neither Eve nor Bob will be able to retrieve all the information transmitted by Alice. In other
words, the cloning process will introduce noise in the relevant variables. Moreover, the measurement of
one variable, e.g., sE2 by Eve, will affect the values of s
B
3 measured by Bob. If Alice prepares and sends
a beam having a Stokes parameter sˆA2 (sˆ
A
3 ), Eve will keep a copy with Stokes parameter sˆ
E
2 (sˆ
E
3 ) with
channel noise Eˆs2(Eˆs3), and Bob will receive one copy with a Stokes parameter sˆ
B
2 (sˆ
B
3 ) with channel noise
Bˆs2(Bˆs3). Taking into account the commutation relations between the (normalized) Stokes parameters,
and assuming that the noises are not correlated to the input signals, it is straightforward [21] to obtain
the following crossed uncertainty relation relative to the noise variances4
(vB;s2vE;s3)
1/2
≥ 1, (15)
and
(vB;s3vE;s2)
1/2
≥ 1. (16)
This means that, because of the constraints above, even a little noise vE;s3(vE;s2) on Eve’s copy will
cause a large disturbance vB;s2(vB;s3) on Bob’s one, if they measure different Stokes variables (s3 and s2,
respectively). In the individual cloning attack, Eve keeps her copy until the reconciliation process, i.e.,
when the public announcement of measurements is made, and only then measuring the “correct” Stokes
variable as an attempt to retrieve useful information. The Shannon information theory is particularly
suitable if one deals with Gaussian continuous variables such as coherent states transmitted through
a Gaussian noisy channel; an important property is that Gaussian noises from independent sources
are additive. Moreover, a Gaussian modulation of the signal sent by Alice allows the reduction of the
information available to Eve [6, 7]. In this formalism, the optimum mutual information between Alice
and Bob IAB is given by Shannon’s formula for a noisy (Gaussian) transmission channel [18]
IAB =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
vm
vBn
)
(17)
where vm is the (normalized) variance of the signal and v
B
n is the noise variance. If one wants to perform
reliable quantum key distribution in the presence of Eve, the mutual information between Alice and Bob
IAB must be larger than the mutual information between Alice and Eve IAE [17], i.e.,
∆I = IAB − IAE > 0. (18)
The Stokes parameters are modulated by Alice with a variance vm. As soon as the beam enters a
Gaussian noisy channel, the signal received by Bob will acquire noise with variance vB;si in its i-th
4It is convenient to work with the variances normalized to |αx|, or vi = Vi/|αx|2.
Stokes parameter. We can make, for simplicity, vB;s2 = vB;s3 = nB. We also have to take into account
the intrinsic quantum noise in the Stokes parameters, so that vBn = 1 + nB. Therefore
IAB =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
vm
vBn
)
=
1
2
log2
(
vm + 1 + nB
1 + nB
)
. (19)
Similarly, for IAE , v
E
n = 1+ nE. Note that, because of Eq.(15), nE = 1/nB, and thus
IAE =
1
2
log2
(
1 +
vm
vEn
)
=
1
2
log2
(
vm + 1 + 1/nB
1 + 1/nB
)
. (20)
We have that as long as nB < 1, ∆I = IAB−IAE increases with the modulation variance vm, analogously
to the quadrature protocol treated in references [6, 7], but for the Stokes variables, instead. The line
transmission parameter is given by η = 1/(1 + nB) [6]; under the condition nB < 1, secure key distri-
bution is allowed in a transmission line with losses less than 50% [6]. Such a result stands for “direct
reconciliation” protocols, where Alice sends to Bob information via a classical public channel. The 50%
limit (3 dB) may be overcome using a “reverse reconciliation technique” [7]. All noise in the transmission
process, apart from the handy Gaussian modulation of the signal and the state intrinsic quantum noise
is attributed to Eve. The preceding discussion has been based on the transmission of fields prepared in
pure coherent states. Nevertheless, a quantum field is more generally (and realistically) described as a
statistical mixture, specially if there are imperfections during the state preparation [22]. Now we are
going to discuss the case in which noisy mixed states, rather than pure coherent states are transmitted.
We consider that the states to be transmitted through the quantum channel are a distribution (statistical
mixture) of coherent states with Gaussian weight (thermal coherent states), having density operator
ρˆtc =
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
d2α1d
2α2 P (α1α2) |α1α2〉〈α1α2|, (21)
with
P (α1;α2) =
1
π2 n2th
exp
(
−
|α1 − α0x|
2
nth
−
|α2 − α0y|
2
nth
)
, (22)
and where nth is the mean number of thermal photons in each mode (the same for simplicity) and α0i
is the central coherent amplitude in the i-th mode of the field. In the case of a strongly polarized beam,
or |α0x|
2 ≫ |α0y|
2, and if we neglect the thermal fluctuations in the y mode, the variances of the Stokes
parameters Sˆ2 and Sˆ3 will be
V2 = V3 = nth + |α0x|
2. (23)
We may again employ the normalized variances vi = Vi/|α0x|
2, so that
v2 = v3 = 1 + r, (24)
where r = nth/|α0x|
2 is a dimensionless parameter indicating the amount of thermal noise. Bearing in
mind that the transmitted field is a quantum Gaussian state, the noises are additive, and we may write
the corresponding mutual informations as
IAB =
1
2
log
[
vm + (1 + r) + nB
(1 + r) + nB
]
, (25)
IAE =
1
2
log
[
vm + (1 + r) + 1/nB
(1 + r) + 1/nB
]
. (26)
The influence of thermal noise is graphically shown in figure 1, where it is shown a plot of ∆I as a
function of the noise parameter r and the line transmission η. As one would expect, the secret bit
rate ∆I decreases for noisier fields (larger r), reducing the secure transmission range of the protocol.
Nevertheless, even for relatively noisy fields, it is still possible secure transmission in a line having up
to 50% of losses (using direct reconciliation), as in the case of pure coherent fields (r = 0). We would
like to remark that the consequences of the thermal noise considered here, not accessible to Eve (not
general), are normally overlooked in the existing literature, and the inclusion of such a noise as we did
in our analysis is surely of relevance if one thinks about a more realistic physical situation.
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Figure 1: Secret key bit rate as a function of the noise parameter r and the line transmission η.
5 Conclusion
The continuous variables quantum key distribution protocols belong to an emerging field; there is great
potential for further development of these methods towards applications. There is no need of special
sources for single photons or entangled beams, and in the case of polarization encoding, precise synchro-
nization of distant stations is not necessary, in contrast to other protocols. The protocol presented here is
an all continuous variables one, in the spirit of the quadrature operators method [7], but without the need
of synchronized stations for homodyne detection. A quantum cryptography protocol based on polarized
coherent states as presented here might be suitable for integration to other cryptographic systems, e.g.,
it could be used to provide secret seed keys to a cryptography protocol [23] using two mode coherent
states. In conclusion, we have presented an alternative method for continuous variable quantum key
distribution which makes use of the polarization properties of coherent states. The encoding in the polar-
ization variables of coherent states offers several advantages; coherent states are easily generated, while
the Stokes parameters are easily measured. Further studies on the protocol as well as its experimental
implementation are being carried out and will be considered elsewhere.
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